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Research
and Development (R&D) Exchange Workshop
March 13 - March 14, 2003
Atlanta, Georgia
Break Out Session
Chart - Papers
- Briefings
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Acrobat Reader to view .pdf files.
Breakout Chart
| Breakout Group |
Suggested Issues |
Support Staff |
Facilitators |
Cyber/Software (1)
Auditorium
|
- Technology
- Hardware
- Intrusion detection
- Authentication
- PKI |
OMNCS: Barbara Forrest
BAH: Annalisa Sheelar
|
Phil Lacombe
Scott Charney |
Cyber/Software (2)
Room 119C
|
- Operating Systems
- Applications
- Exploits
- Tools |
OMNCS: Lisa Daly
BAH: David Hosaflook
BAH: Ben Hawkinson |
Sami Saydjari
Carl Landwehr |
Physical Security
Room 439
|
- Biometrics
- Resiliency
- Assets |
OMNCS: Alaina Hatcher
BAH: Erin MacDougall |
David Barron
Jim Craft |
Human Factors
Room 119B
|
- Insider threats
- Business processes
- Implementation issues
- Training
- Cultural |
OMNCS: Janet Jefferson
BAH: Dave Sulek |
Marissa Reddy
Michael Vatis |
Integration
5th Floor Boardroom
|
- Modeling and simulation
- Validation
- Test beds
- Enterprise implementation |
OMNCS: Alberta Ross
BAH: Shelly Brown |
Stephen Squires
Shannon Kellogg |
| Unassigned |
|
OMNCS: Kiesha Miller
GA Tech: Heather Ellis |
|
Breakout Papers
Human Factors Break Out Session
The efficacy of any technology is directly dependent upon
the ability of humans to configure, implement, and manage it as it was
designed. Several factors—user awareness, policy and procedures,
legal issues, and business pressures—all shape how trust is instilled
in systems. Poor user awareness or inadequate policies, for example,
can manifest two problems. First, users unfamiliar with key technologies
designed to engineer trust into networked information systems can inadvertently
expose those systems to risk through poor configuration, implementation,
or management. Second, insiders remain a vexing problem in terms of
building trustworthy systems. Without strong protections (such as background
checks, strong access controls), insiders may be able to exploit what
might be technically considered a “trustworthy system.”
To better instill trust in NS/EP telecommunications systems, the group
will discuss the following questions:
- What is the current state of affairs with regarding
R&D of human factors affected trusted systems? What technologies
- or other research avenues - offer the most promise?
- What technologies support a “secure by default”
installation, that does not require users to “lock down”
the technology via extensive, confusing configuration choices?
- What technologies support creation of “security
templates” so that organizations can make organization-specific
security configuration choices, and then provide the templates
to users?
- What technologies prevent malicious trusted insiders
from installing and running unauthorized software? (cryptographically
authenticating software integrity before execution would reduce
such risks)
- What technology areas offer the most potential to improve
the human element of trustworthiness? Which area(s) warrant the most
attention?
- What impediments might inhibit further R&D in the
area of human factors (e.g., legal, policy, sociological, business
considerations)?
- Based on the breakout session discussions, what input
would you provide to the White House’s Office of Science and
Technology Policy in its preparation of the President’s research
agenda and budget requests? What are the underlying policy issues
that should be studied by the President’s NSTAC or other body?
- What would be your 3-4 key points related to
developing an “Agenda for Action: Trusted NS/EP Telecommunications”
on the issues related to human factors?
Integration Break Out Session
Research and development of “trusted computing”
places an understandable emphasis on improved design and implementation.
A key question is how can trust be effectively managed and integrated
as technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace; vendors produce new,
proprietary solutions; network providers deploy those solutions; and
users employ a host of new applications never accounted for in the original
design of some operating platforms. Given the complexity and continuous
evolution of computer networks (and the physical locations that house
them and humans that operate them), “trust” is a moving
target. Developing new integration tools and techniques—large-scale
testbeds to test trustworthiness before deployment; modeling/simulation
techniques to continuously assess the “weak links in the chain;”
and common test and evaluation criteria—are essential to promoting
trusted systems. To better instill trust in NS/EP telecommunications
systems, the group will discuss the following questions:
- What is the current state of affairs with respect to
integration of tools/techniques (e.g., testbeds, pilots, and prototype
applications) in the R&D process? What other mechanisms offer
the most promise of promoting integration?
- What technology approaches offer the most potential
to improve the ability to accelerate integration of advanced technologies
into a trusted system? Which area(s) warrant the most attention?
- What impediments might inhibit further R&D integration
(e.g., funding; legal and policy issues; cultural issues between industry,
government, and academia)?
- Based on the session discussions, what input would
you provide to the White House’s Office of Science and Technology
Policy in its preparation of the President’s research agenda
and budget requests? What are the underlying policy issues that should
be studied by the President’s NSTAC or other body?
- What would be your 3-4 key points related to
developing an “Agenda for Action: Trusted NS/EP Telecommunications”
on the issues related to integration?
Physical Break Out Session
As the September 11 attacks clearly illustrated,
trusted systems may also be compromised via damage to and/or infiltration
of the physical locality in which the system is housed. Damage to the
facility itself may be caused by a variety of environmental and human-based
factors (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, unintentional cable cuts, malicious
terrorist attacks) and has the potential to destroy or severely disable
trusted systems. In addition, vulnerabilities in site protection (e.g.,
lack of security guards, internal personnel access controls) leave trusted
systems susceptible to tampering both from external and internal threats.
To better instill trust in NS/EP telecommunications systems, the group
will discuss the following questions:
- What is the current state of affairs regarding R&D
related to physical security? What technologies - or other research
avenues - offer the most promise (e.g., biometrics, token-based tools)?
- What technology areas offer the most potential to improve
the physical security of trusted systems? Which area(s) warrant the
most attention?
- What impediments might inhibit further R&D in the
area of physical security (economic, political, social)?
- Based on the breakout session discussions, what input
would you provide to the White House’s Office of Science and
Technology Policy in its preparation of the President’s research
agenda and budget requests? What are the underlying policy issues
that should be studied by the President’s NSTAC or other body?
- What would be your 3-4 key points related to
developing an “Agenda for Action: Trusted NS/EP Telecommunications”
on physical security issues?
Cyber/Software Break Out Session
The National Research Council’s seminal report,
Trust in Cyberspace, framed a set of issues related to trustworthiness.
Specifically, the report focused on the correctness, security, reliability,
safety, and survivability of the PSN and the Internet; logical elements
of computer networks; and systems, devices, and applications employed
by end users. To protect against the threat of malicious software and
distributed denial of service attacks, an array of technologies have
been researched, developed, and fielded—firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, virtual private networks, etc. Those technologies, however,
are limited by several factors, including the inability to keep pace
with attack profiles, interoperability issues between proprietary solutions,
and inconsistent patch implementation.
Software plays an integral role in achieving trustworthiness
in networked information systems as it is the software that integrates
and customizes general-purpose system components to accomplish any given
task. Consequently, inadequate software security can have many far-reaching
negative consequences that detract from the overall trustworthiness
of information systems. Factors related to software that can affect
the trustworthiness of systems include, but are not limited to: (1)
complex source code that could contain millions of lines of code to
be tested and evaluated in short time periods; (2) the connection of
legacy systems with more current, diverse systems; (3) the movement
toward using commercial off the shelf (COTS) software which in many
cases causes developers to become dependent on third party vendors for
the design and security of important components; (4) inability to ensure
that system administrators are updating system software patches in a
timely manner, and (5) other influences, such as standards and/or regulations,
that compete with efforts to develop trusted systems. To better instill
trust in NS/EP telecommunications systems, the group will discuss the
following questions:
- What is the current state of affairs regarding
R&D of trustworthiness in cyber systems? What technologies (e.g.,
firewalls, IDS, etc) offer the most promise? Which cyber technologies
are on the cusp of a major breakthrough?
- What technologies are using Digital Signal Processing
techniques to evaluate transfer control protocol/Internet protocol
(TCP/IP) session control loop behavior in support of intrusion
detection?
- What technologies are using stateful network diverters
to redirect intruder packet streams to deception networks?
- What technologies are using neural networks for
two stage intrusion detection? (anomaly detection followed by
autonomous classification of anomalous network events)
- What technologies are analyzing role-based network
behavior by means of neural network autonomous classification?
- What technologies implement a “deny all,
except” security model based on cryptographically authenticating
software integrity before execution?
- What technologies offer the promise of cryptographically
authenticating software integrity before execution?
- How can the use of high-level languages reduce
software bugs that adversely impact security?
- How could development of non-executable stacks
in commercial operating systems reduce the impact of buffer exploits?
- What technology areas offer the most potential
to improve the trustworthiness of cyber systems in the future? Which
area(s) should receive the most attention?
- What efforts are underway to develop and field
secure network protocols? What is NSTAC recommending to the Internet
Engineering Task Force working groups regarding near-term implementation
of secure network protocols?
- What impediments might inhibit further R&D
for building trustworthy cyber systems?
- What are the impacts of software patents on the
R&D of security technologies?
- What are the impacts of legacy code in the development
of secure software?
- What are the security risks associated with offshore
software development?
- What are the impacts of software patents on the
R&D of security technologies?
- Based on the breakout session discussions, what input
would you provide to the White House’s Office of Science and
Technology Policy in its preparation of the President’s research
agenda and budget requests? What are the underlying policy issues
that should be studied by the President’s NSTAC or other bodies?
- What would be your 3-4 key points related to developing
an “Agenda for Action: Trusted NS/EP Telecommunications”
on instilling trustworthiness in cyber systems?
Break Out Session Briefings
(all documents are in PDF format)
Human
Factor Break Out Session pdf
Integration
Break Out Session.pdf
Physical
Break Out Session.pdf
Cyber/Software
Session 1.pdf
Cyber/Software
Session 2.pdf
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Reviewed December 07, 2006
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